В начале 1950-х годов страна испыты

В начале 1950-х годов страна испытывала достаточно острый продовольственный кризис. Вольно или невольно, но новое руководство в лице Н.Хрущева и его креатуры должно было продемонстрировать обществу свое видение выхода из него.
Теоретически ситуация могла развиваться по двум путям. Первый вариант выхода из кризиса предполагал радикальную развязку, а именно: глубокую трансформацию системы производственных отношений, т.е. переход к рыночным механизмам, а также включение личного интереса, что было достижимо лишь по мере приватизации собственности, и прежде всего - на землю. Понятно, что подобное развитие событий даже не обсуждалось.
В целях самосохранения Система выбрала гораздо более привычную, так сказать, экстенсивную модель решения проблемы. Смягчить (а затем устранить) продовольственный коллапс предполагалось за счет резкого увеличения зернового клина. В этой связи был взят курс на распашку гигантских земельных массивов на востоке страны, т.е. "освоение" целины. Для этого не требовалось поступаться идеологическими догмами. Достаточно было собрать в единую армаду тракторы и, обыгрывая энтузиазм народа, совершить марш-бросок за Урал.
Таким образом, будет правомерным сказать, что в известном смысле целина сыграла роль фактора, сработавшего на реанимирование входившей в состояние комы системы, оттянув ее агонию еще на долгие годы (подобно тому, как чуть позже Самотлор, позволив долгие годы держать страну на наркотике нефтедолларов и создавать иллюзию благополучия). Хотя и гипотетически, но можно предположить, что если бы не "целинный маневр", то возможности для сохранения Системы в неизменном виде оказались бы еще более суженными.
Отвергая данный тезис и пытаясь найти ему контрдоводы, некоторые исследователи обычно утверждают, что Н. Хрущев просто не имел другого выхода, ибо подъем зернового производства в традиционно сложившемся земледельческом ареале (Украина, юг России и т.д.) был в то время невозможным в силу недостаточного развития химической отрасли, т.е. промышленности удобрений.
Соглашаясь с констатацией последнего обстоятельства, следует тем не менее подчеркнуть, что даже за пределами рыночно-приватизационной возможности, т.е. в рамках привычного экстенсивного варианта, имелись достаточно приемлемые, во всяком случае, альтернативные по отношению к "целинной идее" пути решения проблемы. Их просто не могло не быть, если учесть уже хотя бы ту данность, что из 300 млн. га черноземных и чернозе-мовидных почв мира 190 млн. га, или две их трети находились на территории СССР. Это ли не гигантский резерв! Кроме того, нужно вспомнить, что в 1954-1958гг. средняя урожайность зерновых составила на целине всего 7,3 ц/га, а в 1962-1965гг. и того меньше - 6,1 ц/га. Как справедливо утверждают экономисты, при таком положении прирост урожайности в стране даже на один центнер по своему результату был бы фактически равносилен освоению всей целины (1). Добавим, что для поднятия урожайности на один центнер вовсе не требовалось "большой химии", достаточно было придерживаться технологической дисциплины или, допустим, провести на полях снегозадержание.
Одним словом, есть основание того, что идея целины, выдвинутая февральско-мартовским (1954г.) Пленумом ЦК КПСС, отнюдь не носила неизбежно-необходимого характера. Напротив, данная акция была лишена объективно обусловленных предпосылок и в своем сущностном целеполагании была движима скорее политико-идеологическими моментами, нежели мотивами сугубо экономической рациональности.
Наиболее масштабные распашки предполагалось осуществить на севере Казахстана. С этого времени именно целина становится наиболее зримым символом восприятия образа Казахстана, предметом особой заботы республики и страны в целом. Что касается Н. Хрущева, то для него она стала подлинной idee fix, важнейшим критерием подбора и расстановки руководящих кадров в республике.
Уже на сентябрьском (1953г.) Пленуме ЦК КПСС он подверг критике руководство Казахстана за недостаточную реализацию сельскохозяйственного потенциала. В этой связи руководителям партийной организации и правительства республики было предложено (естественно, в директивном порядке) разработать конкретный план подъема целинных земель. В конце ноября 1953г. такой план был представлен в ЦК КПСС. В соответствии с ним предполагалось, что в течение 1954-1957гг. посевные площади в Казахстане будут увеличены на 2,5 млн. гектаров (2).
Понятно, что такие "робкие наметки" не устраивали "Дом на Старой площади" (здание ЦК партии), ибо там уже дозревал план гораздо более крупномасштабных распашек "целинной нови", и не за четыре, а буквально за один-два года. Поэтому вскоре Москва (соблюдая, впрочем, политес в виде пленумов и прочее) снимает с должности секретаря Казахстанской партийной организации Ж. Шаяхметова, а затем и председателя Совета Министров Н. Ундасынова. Новым главой правительства назначается Д.Кунаев. А для "укрепления партийной организации республики" Центр направил сюда одного из организаторов партизанского движения в годы войны, а тогда ми

Результаты (английский) 1:

At the beginning of 1950-ies of the country experienced quite an acute food crisis. Willingly or unwillingly, but the new leadership in the face of Khrushchev and his protégés was supposed to demonstrate the society his vision for withdrawing from it.In theory, the situation can develop in two ways. The first version of the exit from the crisis assumed a radical interchange, namely: deep transformation of industrial relations system, i.e. the transition to market-based mechanisms, as well as the inclusion of the personal interest that was achievable only as privatization, especially on the ground. It is clear that such a development was not even discussed.For self-preservation System chose the much more familiar, so to speak, an extensive model for solving the problem. Soften (and then fix) ware was supposed to collapse due to a sharp increase in grain wedge. In this regard, embarked on plowing giant land areas in the East of the country, i.e. "Mastering" Virgin soil. To accomplish this without compromising ideological dogmas. It was enough to gather into a single Armada tractors and, playing with the enthusiasm of the people, to March behind the Urals.Thus, it is legitimate to say that in a sense, Celina has played the role of factors that intervened at the insistence in a coma, system pulling off her agony even for years to come (just as later Samotlor, allowing for years to keep the country on drug petrodollars and create the illusion of prosperity). Although hypothetical, but it can be assumed that if it had not been "tselinny maneuver", the ability to save the System intact would be even more restricted.Rejecting the thesis and trying to find him a kontrdovody, some researchers argue that Nikita Khrushchev simply had no other choice, because the rise of grain production in the traditionally established agricultural area (Ukraine, Russia South, etc.) was impossible due to the insufficient development of the chemical industry, i.e. industry of fertilizers.Соглашаясь с констатацией последнего обстоятельства, следует тем не менее подчеркнуть, что даже за пределами рыночно-приватизационной возможности, т.е. в рамках привычного экстенсивного варианта, имелись достаточно приемлемые, во всяком случае, альтернативные по отношению к "целинной идее" пути решения проблемы. Их просто не могло не быть, если учесть уже хотя бы ту данность, что из 300 млн. га черноземных и чернозе-мовидных почв мира 190 млн. га, или две их трети находились на территории СССР. Это ли не гигантский резерв! Кроме того, нужно вспомнить, что в 1954-1958гг. средняя урожайность зерновых составила на целине всего 7,3 ц/га, а в 1962-1965гг. и того меньше - 6,1 ц/га. Как справедливо утверждают экономисты, при таком положении прирост урожайности в стране даже на один центнер по своему результату был бы фактически равносилен освоению всей целины (1). Добавим, что для поднятия урожайности на один центнер вовсе не требовалось "большой химии", достаточно было придерживаться технологической дисциплины или, допустим, провести на полях снегозадержание.In short, there is a reason that the idea of Virgin soil, launched fevral′sko-the March (1954) by the plenum of the CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, did not necessarily indispensable nature. On the contrary, this action had no objectively arising from premises and in its substantiality celepolaganii was driven by political and ideological rather than purely motivated moments of economic rationality.The most extensive ploughing exercise was expected in the North of Kazakhstan. Since that time it is Celina becomes the most visible symbol of the perception of the image of Kazakhstan, the subject of special concern of the Republic and the country as a whole. With regard to Khrushchev, for him it was the genuine idee fix, the most important criterion for the selection and placement of cadres in the Republic.Already at the September (1953) plenum of the CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE he criticized the leadership of Kazakhstan for insufficient implementation of agricultural potential. In this regard, the heads of the party organization and the Government of the Republic was requested (naturally, in the policy) to develop a concrete plan for the recovery of virgin lands. In late November, 1953. This plan was submitted to the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the CPSU. According to him, it was anticipated that during 1954-1957, is used. sown area in Kazakhstan will be increased to 2.5 million. hectares (2).It is clear that such "tentative indications" did not satisfy the "House on the old square" (the building of the Communist Party), since there's already a faintest idea plan much larger raspašek "Virgin Novi", and not four, and just for one or two years. So soon Moscow (observing, however, polites as plenums, etc) dismisses Secretary of Kazakhstan party organization j. Shayakhmetova, and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers n. Undasynova. The new head of Government appointed kunayev. And to "strengthen party organization" Centre sent here by one of the organizers of the partisan movement during the war, and then the MI

Результаты (английский) 2:

In the early 1950s, the country experienced sharp enough food crisis. Deliberately or not, but the new leadership in the face of Nikita Khrushchev and his minions had to demonstrate their vision of society out of it.
Theoretically, a situation could develop in two ways. The first option out of the crisis assumed a radical outcome, namely a profound transformation of the system of relations of production, ie, transition to market mechanisms, as well as the inclusion of self-interest that has been achieved only to the extent of privatization of the property, and above all - on the ground. It is clear that such a development of events is not even discussed.
For the purposes of self-preservation system chosen is much more familiar, so to speak, an extensive model for solving the problem. Soften (and then remove) the food was supposed to collapse due to a sharp increase in grain wedge. In this regard, it embarked on plowing huge tracts of land to the east of the country, ie, "development" virgin land. For this was not required to renounce ideological dogmas. It was enough to assemble into a single armada tractors and, playing with the enthusiasm of the people, to make a forced march to the Urals.
Thus, it is legitimate to say that in a certain sense, virgin played the role of factors that intervened in the resuscitation enters a state of coma system, pulling her agony for another many years (just as later Samotlor, allowing many years to keep drug petrodollars and create the illusion of well-being). Although hypothetical, but it can be assumed that if it was not "virgin maneuver", the possibility to save the system intact would have been even more narrowed.
In rejecting this argument, and trying to find his rebuttal, some researchers usually argued that Khrushchev simply had no other choice, because the rise in grain production traditionally an agricultural habitat (Ukraine, south Russia, etc.) at that time was not possible due to insufficient development of the chemical industry, ie fertilizer industry.
Agreeing with the last statement of the circumstances, it should nevertheless be emphasized that even outside the market-privatization opportunities, ie, within the usual extensive options, it was quite acceptable, in any case, the alternative with respect to the "virgin idea of" ways to solve the problem. They simply could not be, if we consider, if only the reality, that of the 300 million. Hectares of black earth and black earth soil of the world-movidnyh 190 million. Ha, or two-thirds of them were on the territory of the USSR. Whether it is a giant pool! In addition, we must remember that in 1954-1958gg. average grain yield amounted to only 7.3 virgin t / ha, and in 1962-1965gg. and even less - 6.1 t / ha. As rightly argue economists, under such circumstances, even the growth of productivity in the country for one quintal of their results would be virtually equivalent to the entire development of virgin lands (1). Add that to raise the yield per quintal is not required "great chemistry", was enough to adhere to the technological discipline, or, for example, to hold on to snow retention fields.
In short, there are reasons that the idea of virgin land, launched February-March (1954). Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, did not necessarily wear-needed character. On the contrary, the action was devoid of objectively determined premises and in its essential goal-setting has been driven more political and ideological moments, rather than motives purely economic rationality.
The most massive plowing intended to implement in northern Kazakhstan. Since that time, it was virgin becomes the most visible symbol of the perception of the image of Kazakhstan, of particular concern to the republic and the country as a whole. As for Khrushchev, then for him it has become a true idee fix, the most important criterion for selection and appointment of leading cadres in the country.
Already in September (1953). Plenum he criticized Kazakh authorities for lack of implementation of the agricultural potential. In this regard, the leaders of the party organization and the government of the republic were invited to (of course, in the decision-making procedure) to develop a specific plan of recovery of virgin lands. In late November 1953. such a plan was presented to the Central Committee. According to him it was assumed that during 1954-1957gg. acreage in Kazakhstan will be increased by 2.5 million. ha (2).
It is clear that such a "tentative outline" not satisfied "House at the Old Square" (the Party Central Committee building), because there is already a plan ripened much more large-scale plowing "virgin Novi ", and not four, but just for one or two years. Therefore, soon Moscow (respecting, however, politesse as plenums, etc.) dismisses the Secretary of the Kazakhstan party organization J. Shayakhmetova, and then chairman of the Council of Ministers N. Undasynova. The new head of government appointed D.Kunaev. And for the "strengthening of the party organization of the republic" Centre sent here one of the organizers of the partisan movement during the war, and then in E

Результаты (английский) 3:

in the early 1950s, the country experienced quite a severe food crisis. willingly or unwillingly, but the new leadership in the face н.хрущева and his креатуры must demonstrate to its vision of withdrawal.theoretically, the situation could evolve in two ways. the first way out of the crisis was the radical road junction, namely, the profound transformation of the production relations, that is. the transition to market-based mechanisms, as well as the inclusion of personal interest, what was achievable only as the privatization of property rights, and particularly on the ground. clearly, this scenario not even discussed.in order to self preservation system has much more ", so to speak, an extensive model to solve the problem. reduce (and eliminate) food collapse was due to the sharp increase in the grain area. in this regard, paving the way for a wide open giant land area to the east of the country, that is. " development of "целины. it didn"t do something against ideological dogma. it was sufficient to collect in a single armada, then tractors and обыгрывая enthusiasm of people to do exercise in the urals.thus, it would be fair to say that in some sense tselina played the role of factor сработавшего on реанимирование under coma system оттянув her agony for many years (as later samotlor, allowing for many years to keep the country drug petrodollars and creating the illusion of well-being). though hypothetical, but suggests that if not целинный maneuver ", means for maintaining the system unchanged, would be more суженными.in this thesis, and try to find him контрдоводы, some researchers usually argue that h. khrushchev"s had no choice, because the rise of grain production in the traditionally agricultural area (ukraine, southern russia, etc.) was not in force at the time of the development of the chemical industry). the fertilizer industry.while agreeing with the statement of the circumstances, it should be emphasized that, even outside the market privatization opportunities, i.e. in the normal irrigation option, there is acceptable, in any case, the alternative to "целинной idea" solutions. they just could not be given for at least the fact that out of $300 million. ha черноземных and чернозе - мовидных soil world 190 million. ha, or two thirds were in the territory of the ussr. isn"t that a reserve. in addition, we need to remember that in 1954 1958гг. the average yield of grain was to целине only 7.3 c / ha, and in 1962 1965гг. and less - 6.1 c / ha. as rightly argue that economists, in