Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs Metro-Gol

Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc Case C-39/97
Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg [Judgment 29 September 1998]
The distinctive character of a trademark, in particular its reputation, had to be taken into account in determining whether there was sufficient similarity between the goods and services covered by that and another proposed mark to give rise to the likelihood of confusion.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities so held, inter alia, on a reference by the German Federal Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty re: Article 4(l)b of the Directive of 21 December 1988 relating to trademarks.
MGM applied in Germany for registration of the word trademark 'Cannon' to be used for video film cassettes and film production distribution and projection for cinemas and television.
Canon Kabushiki Kaisha opposed the application on the ground that it infringed its earlier world trademark 'Canon' registered in Germany in respect of, inter alia, still and motion picture cameras, and projectors, and television filming, recording, transmission, receiving and reproduction devices, including tape and disc devices.
In the course of the proceedings, it was held, inter alia, that the mark 'Canon' had a reputation, but no importance was to be attached to that fact in deciding whether the marks were relevantly similar.
Article 4(1) of Directive 89/104 provides:
‘A trademark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid, if because of its identity with or similarity to, the earlier trademark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trademarks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trademark.’
In its judgment the Court of Justice held:
The first question was whether the distinctive character of the earlier mark, and in particular its reputation, were to be taken into account in determining the issue of similarity.
Furthermore, according to the case law of the Court, the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the risk of confusion: since protection of a trademark depended, in accordance with Article 4(l)b of the Directive, on there being a likelihood of confusion; marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se" or because of the reputation they possessed on the market, enjoyed broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character.
It followed that, for the purposes of Article 4(l)b, registration of a trademark might have to be refused, despite a lesser degree of similarity between the goods and services covered, where the marks were very similar and the earlier mark, in particular its reputation, was highly distinctive.
The second question was whether there could be a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 4(l)b where the public perception was that the goods or services had different places of origin. There was such likelihood of confusion where the public could be mistaken as to the origin of the goods or services.
The essential function of the trademark was to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which had another origin.
For the trademark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty sought to establish, it had to offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it had originated under the control of a single undertaking which was responsible for their quality.
Accordingly, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question came from the same undertaking or economically linked undertakings constituted a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 4(l)b.
Consequently, in order to demonstrate that there was no likelihood of confusion, it was not sufficient to show simply that there was no likelihood of the public being confused as to the place of production of the goods or services.
On those grounds the Court of Justice ruled:
There could be likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 4(l)b even where the public perception was that the goods or services had different places of production. By contrast, there could be no such likelihood where it did not appear that the public could believe that goods or services came from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.
' among other things (Latin) " in itself (Latin)Canon Kabushiki Kaisha по сравнению со случаем Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc C-39/97

Результаты (русский) 1:

Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc Case C-39/97Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg [Judgment 29 September 1998]The distinctive character of a trademark, in particular its reputation, had to be taken into account in determining whether there was sufficient similarity between the goods and services covered by that and another proposed mark to give rise to the likelihood of confusion.The Court of Justice of the European Communities so held, inter alia, on a reference by the German Federal Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty re: Article 4(l)b of the Directive of 21 December 1988 relating to trademarks.MGM applied in Germany for registration of the word trademark 'Cannon' to be used for video film cassettes and film production distribution and projection for cinemas and television.Canon Kabushiki Kaisha opposed the application on the ground that it infringed its earlier world trademark 'Canon' registered in Germany in respect of, inter alia, still and motion picture cameras, and projectors, and television filming, recording, transmission, receiving and reproduction devices, including tape and disc devices.In the course of the proceedings, it was held, inter alia, that the mark 'Canon' had a reputation, but no importance was to be attached to that fact in deciding whether the marks were relevantly similar.Статья 4(1) директивы 89/104 обеспечивает:'Товарный знак не должен быть зарегистрирован или, если зарегистрированы, наказывается объявлены недействительными, если из-за его личность с или сходство, ранее товарного знака и личность или сходство товаров или услуг, охватываемых товарные знаки, существует вероятность путаницы со стороны общественности, которая включает в себя вероятность ассоциации с более ранних товарным знаком'.В своем решении суд постановил:Первый вопрос был ли отличительные символ знака ранее и в частности свою репутацию, должны быть приняты во внимание при определении вопроса о схожести.Кроме того, согласно прецедентного права суда, более характерный ранее знак, тем больше риск путаницы: поскольку зависит защита товарного знака, в соответствии со статьей 4 (l) b директивы, на что вероятность путаницы; знаки с весьма отличительный характер, либо само по себе"или из-за репутации, они обладали на рынке, пользуются более широкой защиты, чем знаки с менее отличительный характер.Из этого следует, что для целей статьи 4 (l) b, регистрация товарного знака, возможно, может быть отказано, несмотря на меньшую степень сходства между товары и услуги охватывают, где знаки были очень похожи и ранее Марк, в частности, свою репутацию, был весьма характерный.The second question was whether there could be a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 4(l)b where the public perception was that the goods or services had different places of origin. There was such likelihood of confusion where the public could be mistaken as to the origin of the goods or services.The essential function of the trademark was to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which had another origin.For the trademark to be able to fulfil its essential role in the system of undistorted competition which the Treaty sought to establish, it had to offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it had originated under the control of a single undertaking which was responsible for their quality.Accordingly, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question came from the same undertaking or economically linked undertakings constituted a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 4(l)b.Consequently, in order to demonstrate that there was no likelihood of confusion, it was not sufficient to show simply that there was no likelihood of the public being confused as to the place of production of the goods or services.On those grounds the Court of Justice ruled:Там может быть вероятность путаницы по смыслу статьи 4 (l) b, даже когда общественное восприятие было что разные места производства товаров или услуг. Напротив, где он не появляется, что общественность могла поверить, что товары или услуги пришли из того же или экономически связанного обязательства, это может быть не такой вероятности.«среди прочего (латиница) "сам по себе (латиница) Canon кабусики гайся по сравнению со случаем Метро-Голдвин-Майер Inc C-39/97

Результаты (русский) 3:

"метро - голдвин майер vs Canon kabushiki. дело c-39 / 97
до суда европейских сообществ в люксембурге [решение 29 сентября 1998 года] [отличительный характер товарного знака, в частности его репутацию,должны быть приняты во внимание при определении того, существуют ли достаточное сходство между товаров и услуг, охватываемых этой и другой предложил марк вызывает вероятность путаницы.
суда европейских сообществ и, в частности, на упоминание германского федерального суда для вынесения предварительного постановления в соответствии статья 177 договора ес вновь: